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Goals: 
 Protect the privacy of users’ genomic data. 
 Protect the privacy of medical unit’s 
confidential data. 
 Allow specialists to access only to the 
genomic data they need (or they are 
authorized for). 
 Keep the access time to a single patient’s 
genomic data to a few seconds. 
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5) “Check my susceptibility to disease X”  
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2) Sequencing  
and encryption 
 A curious party at the Storage and Processing Unit (SPU), 
who tries to infer the genomic sequence of a patient from his 
stored data. 
 A malicious medical center, who can be considered either as 
an attacker that hacks into the medical center’s system or a 
disgruntled employee, who happens to access the medical 
center’s database.  
 Store patients’ genomic data encrypted by their public keys at the Storage and 
Processing Unit (SPU). 
 Process the encrypted genomic data for medical tests and personalized medicine 
methods using homomorphic re-encryption and proxy encryption. 
A full genome sequence not only uniquely identifies each one of us; it 
also contains information about our ethnic heritage, disease 
predispositions, and many other phenotypic traits. 
The human genome has approximately 3 billion letters. 
• Future work: develop new techniques to prevent the leakage of genomic 
data. 
• Encourage the use of genomic data, by the individual and by the medical 
center, and accelerate the move of genomics into clinical practice. 
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 Intel Core i7-2620M CPU with 2.70 GHz processor. 
 Size of the security parameter: 4096 bits. 
 Real SNP profiles from 1000 Genomes Project. 
 Java programming language. 
Threats due to genomic data leakage: 
 Revelation of predisposition to diseases, ethnicity, paternity, 
filiation, etc. 
 Genetic discrimination. 
 Denial of access to health insurance, mortgage, education, and 
employment. 
 Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs): DNA 
variations, occurring when a single nucleotide differs 
between members of the same species. 
 Potential nucleotides for a SNP position are called 
alleles. 
 A disease susceptibility test is done by analyzing 
particular SNPs. 
 Each SNP contributes to the disease susceptibility in a different amount.  
 40 million approved SNPs in the human population. 
 Each patient carries around 4 million SNPs out of 40 million – real SNPs of the patient. 
 SNPs are correlated to each other depending on the Linkage Disequilibrium (LD) 
property. 
Collaboration: 
 EPFL - School of Computer and Communication Sciences. 
 EPFL - School of Life Sciences. 
 University Hospital of Lausanne (CHUV). 
 Sophiagenetics.com. 
4.  Threat Model 
5. Quantification of Genomic Privacy 
At the Medical Center: 
 From the results of genetic tests, 
the MC can learn more information 
than it is authorized by using: 
o Characteristics of the exposed 
SNPs (LD). 
o Disease markers and their 
contributions. 
 Quantifying genomic privacy by 
computing the decrease in privacy 
of a patient as a result of the 
number of tests he undergoes. 
o Test 1: MC obtains a subset of 
P’s SNPS. 
o Test 2: MC obtains the end-
result of a genetic test. 
o Use of asymmetric entropy as 
genomic privacy metric. 
 
o 𝑝𝑖 is the probability of correctly inferring the content of a SNP and w is the point at 
which the entropy is maximum. 
ℎ 𝑝𝑖 =
𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝑝𝑖)
−2𝑤 + 1 𝑝𝑖 +𝑤2
 
ASYMMETRIC ENTROPY 
Web link: http://lca.epfl.ch/projects/genomic-privacy/ 
